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Language has traditionally been a crucial component of Ukrainian identity. Given the lack of independent 
statehood, Ukrainian identity was primarily ethnocultural rather than civic. However, the contradictory 
policies of the Soviet regime produced a large-scale discrepancy between the language use and ethnocultural 
identity. Moreover, independence boosted Ukrainian civic identity and stimulated reconsideration of its 
relationship with the ethnocultural identity of the titular group. Although the Ukrainian language occupies a 
special place in both main versions of Ukrainian identity, it has to be reconciled with the continued reliance on 
Russian of about half of Ukraine’s citizens. At the same time, the perception of oneself as Ukrainian is 
gradually shifting from ethnocultural to civic, particularly among the young generations raised in 
independent Ukraine. Last but not least, the escalation of an identity struggle in the wake of the Orange 
Revolution led to different dynamics in the two parts of the country. 
 
 





Although a close relationship between language and identity is widely recognised, its specific 
nature in a particular socio-historical context often remains assumed rather than explored. In 
this article, I will analyse a special role of the titular language in Ukrainian ethnic and national 
identity as well as a change in this role after the establishment of the independent Ukrainian 
state. Before examining the relationship between language and identity in the specific 
Ukrainian context, I would like to problematise each of these concepts and their relation more 
generally. 
 
Language can be defined as human capacity for communication and self-expression, more 
specifically, for acquiring and using systems of communication and self-expression which are, 
not by chance, also called languages. A language is a system recognised in this capacity, that 
is, codified and imposed in certain domains of use (in contrast to such standardised 
languages, other systems are called dialects, slangs, mixtures, etc., by which terms their 
systematicity is denied). The latter meaning directly relates language to identity: a language is 
a system used by a particular collectivity – first and foremost, a nation – whose identity it 
expresses and is part of. Therefore, ideally there should be one-to-one correspondence 
between languages and nations, or languages and national identities of which eponymous 
languages are the key part. However, this correspondence can be violated if changes in 
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language are not accompanied by changes in identity, that is, if people come to speak a 
different language than that of their group but continue to identify with that group, or, 
conversely, come to identify with a different group but speak the language of the former one. 
Identity is self-perception, or rather self-perception which can be sustained in interaction with 
others. That is, one’s self-categorization should be matched by the categorization applied by 
others. The categorization in a given act of interaction results, on the one hand, from features 
displayed in this very act and, on the other, from pre-established categories assumed to be 
valid in all interactions. For immediate categorization, language is an important element, 
together with other perceptible features such as race, sex, age, etc., or even more important 
than these because ‘the presence of a communication barrier renders such differences 
immediately relevant … in social encounters, making it more likely that they will be used as 
rules of thumb’, that is, endowed with special significance as a point of personal reference 
informing one’s understanding of and behavior in a given situation.1 Simply put, people are 
likely to treat those speaking a different language as different from themselves, which affects 
– in most cases negatively – their manner of interaction with such people. Those speaking the 
same language tend to be viewed as similar and, by extension, kindred, potentially worthy of 
favourable treatment. This special significance makes a person’s language use a crucial part of 
a set of references commonly referred to as ethnicity or ethnic identity, which also includes 
perceptions of common descent, history, religion and way of life with other members of the 
same ethnic group. 
 
However, once established, this relation of language to ethnicity and its concomitant 
attributes (appearance, customs, religion, etc.) is not easy to change in further acts of 
interaction where the same person may display different features. Since these attributes are 
assumed to be inherent to the group’s members, the membership in it becomes permanent 
and perceived to be based on inheritance rather than performance. According to Fishman, ‘[i]t 
is precisely because language is so often taken as a biological inheritance that its association 
with ethnic paternity is both frequent and powerful.’2 The established social system of 
categorization thus supersedes one resulting from direct interpersonal interaction. Of course, 
the original categorization was related to language use of people in question but its 
subsequent internalization by these people made it rather independent from actual use of the 
group identified by the eponymous language. The Ukrainian situation provides an excellent 
illustration of this transformation. 
 
Language and identity in Ukraine before independence 
 
The external categorization of the ancestors of today’s Ukrainians on the basis of language 
they spoke did not initially coincide with the internal one which was primarily based on 
religion, class, and locality. Any stable ethnocultural identity did not become widespread 
among the low classes until the early 20th century which was marked by overt competition 
between different projects of national or supranational identity whose elite proponents sought 
to win over peasant masses.3 But among the educated strata there emerged already in the 
nineteenth century a vision of the Ukrainian people as encompassing all those who speak the 
Ukrainian language in all of its varieties. Remarkably, this vision included people living in 
different states, primarily the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires. At the end of that 
century nationalist elites in Galicia and then in Russian Ukraine articulated the idea of uniting 
1 H. E. Hale, ‘Explaining ethnicity,’ Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 37, No. 4,2004, p. 474. 
2 J. A. Fishman, Language and Ethnicity in Minority Sociolinguistic Perspective, Clevedon and Philadelphia, Multilingual 
Matters, 1989, p. 26. 
3 B. Krawchenko, Social Change and National Consciousness on Twentieth-Century Ukraine, London, Macmillan 1985, p. 49. 
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all territories with Ukrainian population in one independent state, even though this idea was 
far from dominant even among the intelligentsia, let alone among the political or economic 
elites.4 
In the Austro-Hungarian Empire, first and foremost in Galicia, the development of education, 
civil society and mass politics brought the elite idea of nation to the masses even before World 
War I when this idea manifested itself in the large-scale support for Ukrainian independence 
during the military confrontation with the Poles. Actually, the distinction from the Poles 
(primarily religious but also linguistic) and competition with the Poles strongly facilitated the 
spread of ethnic awareness among Galician Ukrainians who increasingly abandoned the self-
designation as Ruthenians.5 Under the inter-war Polish rule, this idea gained further strength 
due to ethnically-based discrimination which contributed to the participation in or support for 
the nationalist resistance movement, particularly during World War II.6 
 
In the Russian Empire, the ethnocultural self-identification of Ukrainians was hindered by the 
proximity of languages and, more importantly, by the religion with Russians. Although the 
Russian scholarly and cultural elite was aware of linguistic distinctiveness of the residents of 
what it called Little Russia, the degree of this distinctiveness and, accordingly, the status of 
Ukrainian variety as a separate language or a dialect of Russian were debatable, with the 
predominance of the latter interpretation at least until the 1905 revolution. And it was this 
interpretation that was clearly favoured by the imperial administration as demonstrated by 
the infamous Valuev circular of 1863 which banned most Ukrainian-language publications on 
the grounds that ‘no separate Little Russian language has ever existed, exists, or can exist.’7 
The decade of relative political liberalization and accompanying cultural animation after 1905 
was not sufficient to implant the idea of Ukrainian nationhood into mass consciousness, so 
this process largely took place during the political and military confrontation in the aftermath 
of the 1917 revolution. The weak sense of ethnocultural distinctiveness among Ukrainian 
masses is traditionally considered one of the main reasons for the failure of attempts to 
establish an independent statehood in this period.8 
 
Paradoxically, the Bolsheviks prevailing over Ukrainian nationalists crucially contributed to 
the spread of ethnolinguistic identity among ordinary Ukrainians. After several years of 
hostility to Ukrainian distinctiveness, the Bolshevik regime began promoting it in education, 
media, public administration and other domains.9 According to Brubaker, the ethno-national 
identity of Ukrainians and other major ethnic groups of the USSR was institutionalised in two 
ways. To focus on the linguistic dimension, the regime, on the one hand, introduced 
standardised Ukrainian as the main territorial language of the Ukrainian SSR, or one of the 
two main languages alongside of the all-Union Russian, supposedly in recognition of the 
predominantly Ukrainian population of the republic. On the other hand, Ukrainian ethnicity 
and language were recognised and, at the same time, imposed as personal characteristics of 
individuals of the supposedly Ukrainian origin.10 Remarkably, the practice of ascribing 
4 I. L. Rudnytsky, ‘The Fourth Universal and Its Ideological Antecedents,’ in T. Hunczak (ed.), The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A 
Study in Revolution, Cambridge, MA, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1977, pp. 186-219; R. Szporluk, ‘Ukraine: From 
imperial periphery to a sovereign state,’ Daedalus, Vol. 126, No. 3, 1997, pp. 86-119. 
5 I. L. Rudnytsky, ‘The Ukrainian National Movement on the Eve of the First World War,’ East European Quarterly, Vol. XI, 
No. 2, 1977, pp. 141-154. 
6 P. R. Magocsi, A History of Ukraine, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1996. See chapter 44. 
7 D. Saunders, ‘Russia’s Ukrainian policy (1847-1905): A demographic approach,’ European History Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 
2, April 1995, pp. 181-208; Magocsi, op. cit., chapter 29. 
8 See e.g. Magocsi, op. cit., chapter 39. 
9 T. Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923 – 1939, Ithaca and London, 
Cornell University Press, 2001, chapter 3; Krawchenko, op. cit., chapter  2. 
10 R. Brubaker, ‘Nationhood and the national question in the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Eurasia: An institutional account,’ 
Theory and Society, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1994, pp. 47-78. 
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individual ethnicity and language conceptually separated these two notions, even if it 
practically aimed at bringing the latter into conformance with the former. While in the 
Russian Empire the census of 1897 inquired about spoken language and established ethnicity 
on the assumption of congruence between the two, the Bolsheviks sought to ascertain the two 
characteristics – nationality and native language – separately in order to measure the gap 
between them which was perceived as a result of imperial russification and meant to be 
overcome by future policies of de-assimilation.11 But then this gap was within single-digit 
percentage even in the big cities, not least because those ‘reverting’ to their ‘abandoned’ non-
Russian nationality usually declared its language as native. 
 
However, since 1933, a radical change in the regime’s priorities brought about rapid 
strengthening of the Russian-language component of public life at the expense of Ukrainian 
and minority languages. Notwithstanding some oscillations in state policies between the 
aggressive promotion of Russian and the moderate support for Ukrainian, the decades after 
World War II were characterised by a gradual expansion of the former language and shrinking 
of the latter. The large-scale immigration from Russia and other republics strengthened the 
role of Russian as a lingua franca, particularly in the cities where most migrants worked and 
lived. Although Ukrainian continued to be used in many cultural and symbolic practices, its 
presence diminished steadily.12 These process affected all parts of Ukraine, but to varying 
degrees. In the western regions which had been incorporated by the USSR during World War 
II and experienced large-scale nationalist resistance the regime tolerated a high level of 
national awareness and thus allowed the continued prevalence of Ukrainian in education, the 
media, and many other domains.13  
 
A major shift in the education policy was introduced in 1958 by a new law on education which 
replaced the principle of instruction in the child’s native language with the principle of free 
parental choice. Moreover, the law made the languages of the republics’ titular nationalities 
an optional subject in Russian-language schools while retaining Russian as a mandatory 
subject in schools with other languages of instruction. This shift brought about a drastic 
decline in urban titular-language education in Ukraine from the 1960s through mid-1980s, 
except of the western regions.14 As a result, 60 percent of ethnic Ukrainians in the 1989 
census declared knowledge of Russian as a second language, but only 33 percent of Ukraine’s 
Russians claimed knowledge of Ukrainian. Moreover, even among ethnic Ukrainians 5 
percent admitted to not knowing the language of their declared ethnic group.15 
 
However, these changes in language competence and use were not accompanied by a 
commensurate change in linguistic and ethnic identities. Apart from cultural inertia, the 
predominant retention of these identities was made possible by public discourses and 
practices recognizing and supporting the existence of separate nations distinguishable first 
and foremost by ‘their’ languages. Moreover, the revision of nationalities policy in the 1930s 
included, to quote Martin, ‘a dramatic turn away from the former Soviet view of nations as 
11 D. Arel, ‘Language categories in censuses: backward- or forward-looking?,’ in D. I. Kertzer and D. Arel (eds.), Census and 
Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity and Language in National Censuses, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, 
pp. 92-120. 
12 Krawchenko, op. cit., chapters 3 and 5; R. J. Kaiser, The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1994, chapter 6. 
13 R. Szporluk, ‘West Ukraine and West Belorussia: Historical tradition, social communication, and linguistic assimilation,’ 
Soviet Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1, January 1979, pp. 76-98. 
14 Y. Bilinsky, ‘The Soviet educational laws of 1958-59 and Soviet nationality policy,’ Soviet Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1962, pp. 
138–157; Krawchenko, op. cit., pp. 229-235. 
15 Natsional’nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR. Po dannym Vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1989 g., Moscow, Finansy i stattistika, 
1991, pp. 78–79; Kaiser, op. cit., pp. 290, 294. 
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fundamentally modern constructs and toward an emphasis on the deep primordial roots of 
modern nations.’16 This primordialism was a consequence of a shift in emphasis from class to 
ethnically-conceived people as a principal unit of social organization. The registration of 
nationality in passports (compounded with the prohibition of free choice and change of 
passport nationality) both reflected and reinforced the perception of ethnicity as a permanent 
hereditary characteristic which, in turn, found its reflection in the continuity of census 
declarations. The predominant declaration by the Ukrainians of their group languages as 
native was facilitated by the presentation of languages as the most natural and valuable 
attributes of the eponymous nations. This presentation continued in public discourse long 
after the promotion of the use of ‘national’ languages ceased to be a priority of the Soviet 
nationalities policy. This perception was supported by administrative, educational, media and 
other institutions in Ukraine and other republics using their titular languages, usually along 
with Russian whereby the former language appeared to be that of the republic and the latter 
that of the union.17 Even in the cities of eastern and southern Ukraine where Russian fully 
dominated in public communication, Ukrainian continued to perform important symbolic 
functions in public signage, official documentations, etc. The only exception was Crimea, 
which had not acquired a Ukrainian ethnolinguistic dimension after its transfer from the 
Russian Federation to Ukraine in 1954: Russian remained the only language of all public 
practices. 
 
Transformation of Ukrainian identity at the time of independence 
 
With the establishment of the independent Ukrainian state, the Ukrainian identity started to 
change in several crucial respects. First of all, the new state deemphasised ethnicity as a factor 
of social life and a marker of individual identity. In particular, it discontinued the Soviet 
practice of registering ethnicity in passports, allegedly in order to bring Ukrainian practice in 
conformity with the European standards.  Moreover, while recognizing particular cultural 
needs and rights of ethnic minorities, the state was otherwise not inclined to differentiate 
between the civic nation and its titular ethnic core. The idea of nationalities as the constituent 
units of Ukrainian society was retained and relied upon in some practices such as the census, 
but public discourse also frequently referred to Ukrainianness of all citizens, regardless of 
their ethnic origin. As a result, the notion ‘Ukrainian,’ in addition to its traditional ethnic 
meaning, increasingly acquired a civic one, particularly among young people who were raised 
in independent Ukraine without the state-prescribed nationality. 
 
To illustrate this point, I will use data of a survey which conducted in February 2012 by the 
Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS).18 As a follow-up to the question who they 
consider themselves by nationality, the respondents were asked to explain how they define 
their nationality, that is, to choose among the suggested options that referred to hereditary, 
civic, linguistic and attitudinal criteria. As Table 1 shows, a clear majority in all ethnic and 
linguistic groups opted for the hereditary way (by nationality of one’s parents), although this 
way may conceal the ethnocultural or civic criterion as inherited from parents who may have 
defined nationality by either language or country. At the same time, one in six respondents 
defined nationality in civic terms, that is, by the country of residence. No wonder that such 
definition turned out to be more popular with ethnic Ukrainians: for them, living in Ukraine 
was another reason to consider themselves Ukrainian. In contrast, ethnic Russians more 
16 Martin, op. cit., p. 443. 
17 V. Kulyk, ‘Constructing common sense: Language and ethnicity in Ukrainian public discourse,’ Ethnic and Racial Studies, 
Vol. 29, No. 2, 2006, pp. 281-314. 
18 The survey was funded by a grant awarded to me by the Shevchenko Scientific Society in America from the Natalia 
Danylchenko Endowment Fund. 
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frequently chose nationality in accordance to the language they speak. While the two main 
linguistic groups (hereafter defined by the main language of everyday use) differ radically in 
the likelihood of applying the linguistic criterion, the difference in the popularity of the civic 
definition was much smaller due to this definition’s appeal to many Russophones who, 
accordingly, declared themselves ethnically Ukrainian rather than Russian. Finally, the 
attitudinal criterion (by my attitude to this nationality) turned out to be least popular in 
almost all groups. 
 
Table 1. Frequencies of answers to the survey question ‘Different people define their national belonging in 
different ways. Please tell how exactly you define your nationality. Give one most important answer’ (KIIS, 
February 2012, in percentage; ‘other’s and ‘hard to say’ responses not shown) 
 
Define nationality by: All Nationality Everyday language Age cohort Ukrainian Russian Ukrainian Russian 18-29 40-49 70+ 
Nationality of my parents  
(or one of my parents)  75.8 75.0 78.3 80.7 72.4 71.7 76.9 81.4 
Country I live in  15.7 19.6 2.9 15.0 13.8 19.1 15.3 13.2 
Language I speak  4.4 2.4 12.1 1.0 8.3 4.7 3.6 2.3 
My attitude toward this 
nationality  2.8 2.0 4.9 2.5 3.4 2.9 2.8 1.9 
 
Differences between age cohorts are smaller which is consistent with my earlier finding that 
age does not exert a big influence on language practice or attitudes.19 Nevertheless, the data 
for three assorted cohorts (at both ends and in the middle of the age spectrum) in Table 1 
show that young people are somewhat more likely than older ones to define nationality by the 
country of residence and somewhat less likely to copy it from their parents.20 This confirms 
that the socialisation in independent Ukraine without the imposed hereditary notion of 
nationality makes the youth more inclined to view themselves as Ukrainian regardless of 
ethnic origin. At the same time, a clear majority of respondents in all cohorts apply the 
hereditary criterion which will thus continue to prevail in the years to come. 
 
The second change results from the promotion of the Ukrainian language in independent 
Ukraine: however moderate and inconsistent, it has increased the prominence of the language 
as an important element of Ukrainian identity. The majority of Ukrainians reject the view that 
speaking the titular language is a prerequisite for being a legitimate citizen of the Ukrainian 
state or a worthwhile member of the Ukrainian nation. For instance, in a December 2005 
nationwide survey of the Razumkov Centre, only 41% of respondents listed the exclusive use 
of the Ukrainian language among essential features of a Ukrainian patriot, a much lower level 
than for civic characteristics such as work for Ukraine’s good (81%), the wish to cultivate love 
for Ukraine in one’s children (78%) and the respect for Ukrainian laws and power institutes 
(75%).21 At the same time, the social role of the titular language as a cultural foundation of 
Ukraine’s independence and a factor of social integration has been accepted by a considerable 
part of the population as demonstrated by further data of the 2012 KIIS survey referred to 
above.  
 
The respondents were asked if they considered the Ukrainian language important for 
Ukraine’s citizens and if so, to list up to three reasons why. As Table 2 shows, few respondents 
19 V. Kulyk, ‘Demographic factors of language practices and attitudes in Ukraine,’ Harvard Ukrainian Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1–
4, 2007, pp. 295–326. 
20 Differences in the popularity of the linguistic and attitudinal criteria are too small to attribute them any social significance. 
21 ‘Spil’na identychnist’ hromadian Ukraїny: osoblyvosti i problemy stanovlennia,’ Natsional’na bezpeka i oborona Ukraїny, 
No. 7, 2006, p. 11. 
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said that Ukrainian was not important; although this view was much more widespread among 
ethnic Russians and Russophones, the share of its supporters did not exceed 10 per cent in 
any ethnolinguistic or demographic group. Among the reasons for importance, the status of 
Ukrainian as the state language was referred to by a clear majority in all groups, but primarily 
among ethnic Ukrainians and Ukrainian-speakers. While this designation combined the roles 
of Ukrainian as the language of the state and the (main) language of the nation, other answers 
pertained to its relation to certain parts of citizens or society as a whole. Ethnic Ukrainians 
and Ukrainophones were more likely than Russians and Russophones to value the titular 
language as supposedly common to all Ukrainian citizens rather than particular to its 
speakers. Some of the options they chose were not of ethnocultural origin but of social 
legitimacy, such as ‘the language of the largest nationality’ and ‘a language traditionally 
spoken in Ukraine’: these are roles justifying the priority of the Ukrainian language, hence 
they were primarily supported by its speakers. Other options pertain to civic values, namely 
the two last options designating the titular language as ‘a foundation of Ukraine’s 
independence’ and ‘a language that unites Ukrainian society’: together they were embraced by 
33% of all respondents but 43% of Ukrainophones. In contrast, Russians and Russian-
speakers were more likely to admit the importance of Ukrainian as something that did not 
pertain to them, such as its predominance in the west (it is an important language, just not 
ours) or even its being a language of great literary and artistic work (which still does not make 
it common to all Ukrainian citizens). Age differences were much smaller than ethnolinguistic 
ones but young people were somewhat more likely to value the civic and unifying role of 
Ukrainian. It can thus be expected that this new role will gain prominence in the future. 
 
Table 2. Frequencies of answers to the survey question ‘Do you consider the Ukrainian language important? If 
so, please tell why you believe so. If it is difficult for you to indicate just one reason, please choose several but 
no more than three reasons which are most important to you’ (KIIS, February 2012, in percentage; ‘other’s and 
‘hard to say’ responses not shown) 
 
Ukrainian language is 
important because it is: 
All Nationality Everyday language Age cohort 
Ukrainian Russian Ukrainian  Russian  18-29 40-49 70+ 
state language 73.5 76.9 60.5 83.1 62.9 74.1 73.9 73.9 
language traditionally 
spoken in Ukraine 28.5 30.3 20.5 32.2 24.3 25.5 26.9 35.8 
language of Ukraine’s 
largest nationality  24.8 27.1 15.6 32.5 16.6 25.9 23.8 18.3 
language of the majority of 
people in western oblasts 15.0 11.4 27.4 8.5 22.2 14.2 14.1 14.0 
language of great literary 
and artistic work 8.9 7.9 11.2 7.0 10.1 8.6 7.9 9.3 
language that constitutes a 
foundation of Ukraine’s 
independence 
19.5 22.2 9.5 26.3 12.6 23.1 19.7 14.8 
language that unites 
Ukrainian society  13.6 14.4 10.3 16.2 9.9 15.5 13.3 9.7 
I do not consider this 
language important 3.0 1.6 8.1 0.2 7.0 2.9 3.3 2.7 
  
This data illustrates another important point, namely that the perceived value of the 
Ukrainian language is not limited to its actual use, or its communicative function. Put another 
way, Ukrainians value the titular language more than they actually speak it. The main reason 
for the continued discrepancy between language identity and practice – between native and 
everyday language – lies in the moderate and inconsistent language policy which does not 
require people to speak the state language even in the public sector, contrary to lamentations 
Kulyk ANZJES 5(2) 
about forcible Ukrainianization.22 In fact, as the same KIIS survey demonstrates, a shift 
toward Ukrainian is more pronounced at home than at work meaning that it is not caused by a 
pressure on the part of the state or non-state employers.23 At the same time, the perceived 
social importance of the titular language urges many people who speak mainly Russian 
themselves to support the increased use of Ukrainian by the state, one may say, to want the 
state to do what they do not want to do themselves. Moreover, many people want the state to 
promote Ukrainian in such a way as not to infringe on their own linguistic comfort with the 
predominance of Russians. 
 
As explained in the previous section, the perception of a language one does not speak much or 
even at all as one’s native language reflects this positive attitude and identification, but they 
are not as strong as to urge people to switch to this language in everyday life or at least use it 
more actively as a second spoken language. This argument is supported by the responses to 
the KIIS survey’s question on the reasons for declaring a certain language as native (the 
declaration having been made in a previous question) which demonstrates the increased 
importance of civic considerations in people’s identification with the Ukrainian language. 
Asked to provide up to three reasons for identifying their native language, a quarter of all 
respondents gave as one of the reasons that language being ‘the language of my country’ (see 
Table 3). That such definition pertains primarily to Ukrainian is confirmed by the fact that a 
much higher percentage of Ukrainian-speakers than Russian-speakers chose this option. 
Nevertheless, in all groups the main criterion for identifying one’s native language turned out 
to be the replication of the choice of one’s parents – whatever combination of ethnic, linguistic 
and civic factors this may involve. Once again, differences between age cohorts are not as 
great as between ethnolinguistic groups. In all cohorts, the most popular way of defining 
native language is by the language of parents. However, young people are somewhat less 
inclined to follow this way and more likely to take one of the alternative approaches, either 
linguistic (by use or thinking) or civic (by the country of residence). There is no clear change 
toward one alternative meaning but the close relation between native language and ancestral 
ethnicity is being gradually undermined. 
 
22 V. Kulyk, ‘Soviet nationalities policies and the discrepancy between ethnocultural identification and language practice in 
Ukraine,’ in M. Beissinger and S. Kotkin (eds.), Historical Legacies of Communism in Russia and Eastern Europe, 
Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press (forthcoming). 
23 This conclusion is based on my analysis of raw data. 
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Table 3. Frequencies of answers to the survey question ‘Why it is this language that you consider native? If it is 
difficult for you to indicate just one reason, please choose several but no more than three reasons which are 
most important to you’ (KIIS, February 2012, in percentage; ‘other’s and ‘hard to say’ responses not shown) 
 
This is the language: All Nationality Everyday language Age cohort Ukrainian Russian Ukrainian Russian 18-29 40-49 70+ 
of my parents 67.8 69.1 62.0 80.4 58.2 69.4 68.9 68.8 
of my nationality 28.3 30.4 21.3 38.8 16.6 31.5 27.4 30.7 
of my country 25.2 29.5 9.5 35.9 12.0 29.3 23.8 25.3 
in which I think 17.8 14.6 27.1 13.9 27.2 18.2 17.9 13.3 
which I normally use 25.9 24.3 30.5 16.5 35.7 24.6 26.1 20.6 
which I know best 11.8 10.1 15.8 7.0 19.2 13.5 12.0 8.2 
which I love most 7.1 7.2 6.6 8.1 6.6 10.2 6.2 5.8 
which I first learned 15.7 14.7 18.2 10.9 19.4 13.1 16.7 16.0 
 
The discrepancy between the perceived social importance of Ukrainian and the comfort of 
continued reliance on Russian is resolved by many people in relegating the titular language to 
the symbolic realm, with little consequence for communicative practice. To illustrate this 
point, I will use data from a survey conducted in December 2006 by the sociological centre 
Hromadska Dumka.24 To make my point clearer, I will juxtapose responses to two questions 
pertaining to the symbolic and communicative functions of the Ukrainian language, 
respectively. One question asked the respondents if they agree that Ukrainian language is one 
of the symbols of Ukrainian statehood. The other question asked if the Ukrainian language 
should be used in Ukraine in a greater, equal or lesser scope than ‘now’ (meaning at the time 
of the survey). As the figures in Table 4 demonstrate, the symbolic role of Ukrainian was 
supported by the overwhelming majority of respondents, including a majority of Russians and 
Russophones (of course, the level of support among ethnic Ukrainians and Ukrainophones 
was much higher than that). In contrast, less than two fifths of all respondents and less than 
one fifth of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers wanted the titular language to be more 
actively used in communicative practice. Although the support for greater use of Ukrainian 
clearly exceeded the support for lesser use, it was far from predominant as another two fifths 
opted for the ‘same scope as now.’ The youth supported each of these propositions more 
emphatically than older people but the gap between the two levels of support (the difference 
between figures in the upper and lower lines of the table) turned out to be the same for both 
cohorts. That is, even when asked about society as a whole rather than their own language 
practice, most people declared a preference for the preservation of the status quo or a very 
moderate increase of the use of Ukrainian which would be largely limited to symbolic 
domains. Their preference is thus in line with language policy of the Yanukovych regime 
which recognizes the formal priority of Ukrainian but tolerates or even encourages the actual 
dominance of Russian in both private and public sector. 
24 The survey was conducted within the framework of the research project ‘Language Policy in Ukraine: Anthropological, 
Linguistic and Further Perspectives,’ which was implemented in 2006–2008 by an international team of scholars with the 
financial support of the International Association for the Promotion of Cooperation with Scientists from the New 
Independent States of the Former Soviet Union (INTAS). 
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Table 4. Frequencies of certain answers to the survey questions ‘Do you agree with the statement that the 
Ukrainian language is one of the symbols of Ukraine’s statehood?’ and ‘Do you believe that the Ukrainian 
language should be used in Ukraine in a greater scope than now, the same as now, or a lesser than now?’ 
(Hromadska Dumka, December 2006, in percentage) 
 
 All Nationality Everyday language Age cohort Ukrainian Russian Ukrainian Russian 18-29 40-49 70+ 
Ukrainian language is a 
symbol of Ukrainian 
statehood: yes or rather yes 
71.2 74.4 59.3 87.6 57.6 72.1 70.5 64.5 
Ukrainian language should be 
used more than now 42.4 50.2 15.2 70.8 18.3 43.7 43.8 32.3 
  
To conclude, the key question of the current relation between Ukrainian language and identity 
is what role the former should play in the latter. The special role of the titular language is 
recognised in both main versions of Ukrainian identity proposed by the elites and espoused by 
the population in independent Ukraine. These versions which can be called Ukrainian 
nationalist and East Slavic, entail Ukraine’s development as a Ukrainian nation-state and a 
part of the Russian-dominated post-Soviet realm, respectively. For the latter version proposed 
by Yanukovych’s Party of Regions, the role of the titular language is limited to symbolic rituals 
and is not expected to affect communicative practice beyond one particular linguistic group 
and the territory of its predominant residence. The ancestral language is thus not considered 
an essential element of contemporary Ukrainian identity. In contrast, the Orange parties 
currently in opposition reject this view as damaging for Ukraine’s post-imperial emancipation 
and transformation, and propose instead an enhancement of both the symbolic and 
communicative roles of the titular language in society which would both reflect and reinforce 
its central place in identity.25 The nationalist version seems to be effective in the west and 
centre of Ukraine but mostly rejected in the east and south.  Rather than the gradual 
Ukrainianisation of the entire country, we may be witnessing its deepening division into two 
parts with different languages and identities, a process accelerated by the Orange Revolution 
and the responsive mobilisation in the south-east.  
 
25 V. Kulyk, ‘The media, history and identity: competing narratives of the past in the Ukrainian popular press,’ National 
Identities, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2011, pp. 287-303. 
23 
                                                          
